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INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS
COLONEL CHRISTOPHER S. MAGGIO, USA

(How well, from an industrial point of
view, have we done in the past to insure
that our country was ready for war? What
are some inadequacies in our present
system of industrial preparedness? What
can be done to improve our condition?)

industrial capacity to support our Armed
Forces. Again, after World War I I , the huge
industrial base, that was built at great expense
t o support the United States and allied forces,
was quickly dismantled. After each of these
major worldwide conflicts, the general trend
was t o get out of war production as soon as
possible. We acted as though we would never
again have a need for the skills, equipment
and factories that make up the military
i n d u s t r i a l base o f a country. Our
demobilization following World War I I was so
rapid and complete that scarcely more than
five years later, when the United States found
herself involved in the Korean War, a total of
over $600 million was spent to re-establish
our ammunition base.1 Also, throughout the
Army, $632 million was spent from 195 1 to
1958 on new metal-working machinery,2 and
most of that was used to establish production
lines t o supply materiel for use in Korea.
Following the truce agreements at
P a n m u n j o m , the United States again
demobilized her production base. This time it
was done more slowly and less completely
than after the previous two wars, nevertheless
there was so much divestment that when the
Vietnam War buildup began, over $350
million had to be spent to activate or augment
that portion of our production base needed to
produce ammunition.3 In addition to the
$350 million, comparable sums were spent in
reassembling the production base needed to
produce the new equipment and weapon
systems in support of Southeast Asia (SEA).

During this century the United States has
gone through four periods of industrial
m o b i l i z a t i o n , each followed by war
p r o d u c t i o n a n d t h e n demobilization.
Unfortunately, we have not applied the
lessons learned from these experiences. In
each period of industrial mobilization we paid
heavily in terms of men, money and time for
our failure to provide an adequate peacetime
industrial base to serve as a springboard t o
wartime production.
When hostilities ceased in World War I
there was a rapid disintegration of our
I
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SOME CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

This essay will consider four major areas
relating to industrial. preparedness. Since the
requirements of the three military services all
have to be met by the United States Industrial
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Base, the four areas will be examined in the
context of total Department of Defense
needs. The areas are neither new nor do they
constitute complete coverage of the industrial
preparedness field. They were chosen because
of their importance to effective industrial
preparedness and because they provide
reasonably complete coverage of the subject
within the limited scope of this essay. The
problems associated with each area have been
studied in great detail in the past. Indeed, the
Department of Defense (DOD) is at this time
reassessing the overall DOD industrial
mobilization program.4 It is hoped that the
results of their reassessment and final
recommendations will be followed by
implementing directives and regulations,
coupled with adequate financial support. This
will help to assure an industrial preparedness
posture capable of activating a future
production base that can sustain us through a
war or limited emergency. Against this
background the following areas will be
discussed in turn:
1. Uniform planning factors for all three
services, to include uniform criteria to
determine the military forces that would be
supported in the initial phases of a
mobilization.
2. Criteria for selection of appropriate
i t e m s and weapon systems to assure
industrial preparedness planning
with a j diclous
, .
and economical application
of resources.
3. Stirnulation of greater participation in
industrial preparedness by private industry
through incentives provided by leasing and
sales agreements and the Armed Services
Procurement Regulations (ASPRs).
4. Modernization of the government
portion of the industrial base t o assure a
s y s t e m a t i c upgrading o f the skills,
manufacturing techniques, equipment, and
plant facilities in our government-owned,
government-operated (GOGO) arsenals;
g o v e r n m e n t - o w n e d , contractor-operated
(GOCO) plants and the layaway packages
(ASODs) used to supplement both the
government and privately-owned industrial
base in time of war.

PLANNING FAC

Uniform planning
military services are
preparedness is to be a realistic
the production base and its ability
to military require
compositio~of the military forces, otherwise
termed the "force structure," constitute the
chief p l a n n i n g f a c t o r for industrial
preparedness, since the force structure forms
the very basis for materiel requirements.
While there exists in each of the three military
services contingency plans to match various
threat analyses and scenarios, the services are
not uniform in their planned response. The
A r m y h a s approached possible future
mobilization in terms of authorized division
force equivalents and approved deployment
schedules as announced in planning and
programing guidance to the services by the
Secretary of Defense.5 The Air Force and the
Navy have viewed mobilization in terms of
their contingency plans matched against a
threat analysis that may or may not have been
the same as the Army's, and not constrained
by fiscal or logistical guidance.
In the past there has been an absence of
clear and consistent policy regarding the force
structure that should be used to form the
basis for industrial mobilization planning. The
establishment of such a force structure for all
the military forces of the Department of
Defense should be based on an integrated
evaluation of the threat and be consistent
throughout the services. The force structure
in each of the services should set the
framework upon which to base our industrial
preparedness. Likewise, it should establish the
stable mobilization production objectives
necessary to support the national mission
strategy for the ten-year mid-range time
period ( 1973-1982).
The objective force levels prescribed in The
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan would apply a
degree of uniformity and facilitate the
industrial mobilization planning of the three
services.6 The identification of production
sources would then be possible, as would the
probable elimination of major production

maximut
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Modern methods t o inspect bore and rifling surfaces using closed circuit television.

bottlenecks. Production levels could be
designed t o insure that they would support
the work being done by the military planner
and would assure that support of the current
strategy is possible. Industrial preparedness
would be enhanced by:
a. Shortening the time required to obtain
additional production capacity needed to
support sustained combat in all theaters;
b. Providing a clear, easily identifiable
f o r c e structure upon which to base
mobilization planning both within the
government and the private sectors;
c. Providing a defensible basis for retention
of existing facilities up to the level considered
necessary by military planners;
d. Providing stability in the industrial
p r e p a r e d n e s s program by eliminating
fluctuations in annual approved force levels
that result from changes in available funds in
the yearly budgets.
The foregoing are some thoughts on the
subject of planning factors. They d o not

constitute complete coverage, but they do
address the most vital aspects of this phase of
preparedness. The next area to be considered
is that of the selection of representative items
and w e a p o n s y s t e m s f o r industrial
preparedness planning which would provide a
high assurance that the industrial base could
be responsive to the total demands for
military hardware in the event of an
emergency.
CRITERIA FOR ITEMS SELECTION

The selection of items for which industria1
p r e p a r e d n e s s p l a n n i n g s h o u l d be
accomplished presents a difficult challenge.
Under present DOD instructions considerable
l a t i t u d e in planning and coverage is
permitted.7 In some cases too many items are
being planned for, resulting in lack of
sufficient depth and a failure to go below the
prime contractor structure. Likewise, the
range of items being planned for does not
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provide adequate coverage, and planning
between the services has lacked compatibility
and consistency.
The criteria for the selection of items
should relate in a very direct and meaningful
way to the objectives of the industrial
preparedness program which are:
a. T o reduce the lead time for delivery of
the selected item;
b. T o provide for more efficient and
economical means of production;
c. T o provide for increased capability to
produce the selected items where production
base shortages exist;
d. T o assess the trade-off benefits between
war reserve stock levels and cost of industrial
preparedness measures that would permit
retention of lower stock levels;
e. T o maintain an adequate mobilization
production base in peacetime.
The criteria should provide for selection of
items which are essential to operational

effectiveness under combat conditions
(including training) or t o the safety and
survival of personnel. It is recognized that the
number of items involved may exceed the
l i m i t a t i o n s o f our capabilities under
peacetime funding constraints and therefore
make it necessary to establish priorities for
planning. Accordingly priorities are suggested
as follows:
Priority 1. Applies when we just do not
have the production base.
Priority 2. A p p l i e s w h e n sufficient
production capacity exists t o meet monthly
mobilization requirements of the peacetime
operational forces but substantial savings in
procurement of end item inventory could be
achieved through trade-offs with:
a. Additional funds for facilities or tooling;
b. Modernization of facilities;
c. Stocking the components for assembling
into the major item at time of need.
Priority 3. Applies when modification of
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One modern multiple axis tape controlled machining center with automatic 24 tool exchanger
replaces many types of older vintage machines.
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the existing production base is necessary to
improve safety conditions, production
quality, abatement of pollution, or to reduce
personnel expenditure or manufacturing
costs.
Utilization of the above criteria and
priorities for selection of items and weapon
systems will provide the means of controlling
our efforts and will result in an efficient use
of resources available in peacetime for
industrial preparedness.
INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRY PARTICIPATION

The present industrial mobilization policy
of the Department of Defense is based on
voluntary participation by industry; there is
n o provision in existing procurement
regulations to compensate contractors for the
time or money spent while participating in
the program. Under present DOD regulations,
contractors enter into an agreement with the
government which is neither contractual nor
binding on either party. These conditions
tend to discourage effective mobilization
planning and do not provide the high
assurance we need that our industrial
preparedness will be responsive in time of
emergency.
An objective, then, in improving the
program would be to establish incentives
which will motivate the contractor to
participate in the industrial preparedness
program and to accomplish the planning in a
meaningful and effective manner.
The incentives or advantages currently
offered to those firms which participate in the
DOD industrial mobilization production
planning 8program are identified in DOD
4005.3M.
These advantages can be summarized as
follows:
- They
afford the contractor an
opportunity to compete for peacetime
procurement on a "favored" basis;
- They obtain for him advance knowledge
of military prime or subcontractors that can
be anticipated in the event of an emergency;
- They offer him an opportunity to have a
c o n t i n u i n g dialogue with government
procurement officials.

Likewise, industry is provided timely
information concerning new peacetime
procurement needs; and conversion to
military production can be accomplished with
minimum delay in the event of an emergency
due to advance knowledge of subcontractors'
sources for major subassemblies and pacing
components.
However, the fact of the matter is that
when the buildup for Vietnam was started,
the emphasis was on price competition. In
other words, we looked for the lowest
responsible bidder and whether or not a
prospective c o n t r a c t o r was in the
mobilization base, it was not a determining
factor in awarding the contract. Generally,
awards were made to the lowest bidder. In
some cases, delivery of the finished product
took longer because the successful bidder was
not in our mobilization base and therefore
not familiar with the item being produced.
Likewise, as already noted, planned producers
under the present system are expected to
volunteer the time of their personnel to the
extent necessary to perform the required
functions for mobilization planning. While the
effort expended here is a recognized
tax-deductible expense which recovers at least
a share of the industry contribution, it does
not offer the incentive that gets our best
producers to participate in the program.
In view of this, it is felt that the following
incentives for industry should be incorporated
into the industrial preparedness program:
1. Procedures under which authority can
b e o b t a i n e d f o r t h e leasing of
government-owned property to planned
emergency producers should be simplified.9
The leasing concept is separate and apart from
that offered by the Facilities Use Contract
under ASPR 13-405 permitting incidental
commercial use on a non-interference basis.
T h e significant feature of the lease
arrangement is that the lease may provide for
the maintenance, protection, repair, or
restoration of the property by the lessee as
part or all of the consideration for the lease of
such property. Thus the maintenance and
availability of essential equipment under
mobilization conditions could be assured.
Likewise, labor skills associated with the
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Nitroglycerin,a basic ingredient in the manufacture of propellants and explosives, is now made
much safer and more efficient using the modern continuous manufacturing line recently
installed at the US Army Ammunition Plant located at Radford, Virginia.

operation of the facilities under lease would
be retained with no cost to the government
for maintaining the facilities during the time
they are under lease. A natural adjunct to a
procedure for leasing is a procedure for
facilitating the sale of industrial property,
which is the next incentive to be discussed.
2. The sale of excess industrial property to
planned emergency producers should be
possible under simplified procedures and
r e g u l a t i o n s t h a t w o u l d provide for
authorization for sale by the Secretaries of
the military departments. 10 The present
regulations governing military sales of
industrial property require that excess
property must be sold on the open
competitive market to the highest bidder.11
A more practical arrangement from the
standpoint of industrial preparedness could be
realized if a planned emergency producer
could buy the government's industrial
property in his plant at a price negotiated
between the producer and the government.
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The sale of the property would be subject to
the National Security Clause of the National
Industrial Reserve Act of 1948 which
provides the legal authority for the
government to recapture the use of the
property or equipment for its use in the event
of an emergency. Under a negotiated sale, the
contractor would have the equipment he
desires for his peacetime non-military
production, while the government would be
assured of the avaiiabilily of needed facilities
and labor skills in time of emergency. It
would appear that such an arrangement with
its obvious advantages t o both sides should be
an accepted practice, but there is some
Congressional opposition. Congressional
objections stem primarily from the view that
the government should get out of the facilities
business, divest itself of holdings of industrial
plant equipment, and avoid competing with
machine tool builders in the sale of
equipment.
3. A series of actions to improve our

interface between procurement policies and
practices and the regulations governing
industrial preparedness is proposed. In
essence, the industrial preparedness program
and the Department of Defense procurement
policy must be regarded as inter-related
matters, with the success of the former largely
dependent on the appropriate application of
the latter. While it is not within the scope of
this essay to delineate specific changes to the
Armed Services Procurement Regulations
(ASPRs) to provide for this inter-relation, it is
pointed out that changes must be made to the
ASPRs if industrial preparedness is to remain
viable during a period of peacetime
production. Specifically:
a. Planned producers must be allowed
extended commercial use of the government
production equipment in their plants;
b. On a selective item basis, authorization
should be given to negotiate contractual
agreements with planned mobilization
producers to include production planning and
related data. This would compensate the
contractor for his efforts, provide a legally
binding instrument between the government
and the contractor, and furnish the additional
incentive to the contractor with the assurance
that he would at least obtain initial
production in the event of mobilization.
c. Multi-year contracts should be utilized
selectively to maintain the mobilization base.
This would provide a "warm" base during
peacetime for selective items and long
lead-time items, thus expediting the transition
from peacetime to war production.
MODERNIZATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL BASE

The final area to be considered involves the
modernization of the present industrial base.
T h i s base includes government-owned,
government-operated (GOGO) arsenals;
government- owned, contractor-operator
(GOCO) plants; and packages of industrial
plant equipment that are presently in layaway
and stored in various locations throughout the
country. These storage sites include those
under supervision of the Department of
Defense industrial plant equipment center,
service storage sites, storage areas in GOGO

and GOCO facilities, and also storage sites in
contractor plants.
In order for us to maintain a responsive
readiness posture in our industrial base we
m u s t systematically modernize our
manufacturing methods and machine tools
during peacetime to keep pace with the
manufacturing state of the art. The
Department of the Army currently has a
modernization program underway which
provides for replacement of obsolete and
worn-out plant equipment and facilities in the
ammunition production base. So far, over
$500 million have been authorized for
modernization of equipment and facilities to
manufacture propellants, explosives, and
small arms ammunition. Priorities for
modernization have been determined on the
basis of safety, pollution abatement,
economical payback, and state of the art. This
program will take care of our ammunition
production base, but if we are to impart the
same degree o f responsiveness and
modernization to the balance of the industrial
base, a similar program should be undertaken
to modernize the facilities for producing
other items of military hardware.
Consistent w i t h available financial
resources a modernization program should be
initiated to update the industrial plant
equipment in our arsenals. The arsenal system
provides the bridge from peacetime to
wartime production and is the training ground
for many segments of American industry in
the early stages of a mobilization. As the gap
is bridged from peacetime to wartime
production, it is imperative that the US
arsenals have modem facilities to manufacture
peacetime requirements and lead the way in
the pilot production at the outset of
mobilization.
The US Army currently has six arsenals
with mission responsibility for research,
development, engineering, procurement and
production for virtually all major items of
Army hardware.12 In addition to assuring a
ready initial wartime capability, these Army
arsenals provide peacetime production where
American industry does not have the
capability to make the items, or because the
quantities are too small to make it
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commercially worthwhile. T o assure our
industrial preparedness, a modest annual
modernization program for these facilities is
essential.
Finally, complementing the government
portion of the industrial base is the private
sector which is augmented in wartime by
government-owned production equipment
and facilities. The government equipment in
this category, referred t o as ASOD packages,
should be subject t o an annual review and a
s y s t e m a t i c annual program should be
established t o replace the oldest and most
obsolete equipment. A recent review of the
ASOD packages indicated that 56 percent of
the active and 68 percent of the inactive
equipment presently exceeds the useful
service life.13
CONCLUSION

I

~

These, then, are the four areas associated
with Industrial Preparedness that should be
examined in depth. These four areas do not
cover all aspects of the entire industrial
mobilization base but they d o constitute the
most important areas which must be kept
viable and receive continued Department of
Defense support in the post-Vietnam War
period. We should not make the same
mistakes today that we made following World
War I, World War I I , and the Korean War.
The costs involved to accomplish the
suggested actions are nominal. T o plan
Industrial Preparedness o n a uniform basis for
all three services should not require any
additional funds. Moreover, an Industrial
Preparedness Program based on a more
realistic selection of weapon systems and
items could result in actual savings through
better use of our available personnel
resources. Likewise, changes in the ASPRs
and regulations governing lease and sale of
industrial plant equipment can be made at no
great cost. These changes will provide
incentives to contractors t o participate in
Industrial Preparedness planning in a more
meaningful way through valid contractual
arrangements and use of otherwise idle
government equipment, and may very likely
prove more economical in the long run.
Finally, an adequately funded annual
program for all three services is needed t o
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keep our industrial base modern and abreast
with the manufacturing state of the art. This
is surely as important as replacing weapons as
they become obsolete with advances in
technology. Indeed, it is a small price to pay
t o propel us into the Number One position in
Industrial Preparedness when we consider the
implications of being Number Two.
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